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CASE NOTE
Labor Law—Civil Rights Act of 1964—Sex Discrimination and the
Bona Fide Occupational Qualification—Diaz v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc. 1—Cello Diaz applied for the position of flight
cabin attendant with Pan American World Airways (Pan Am) on April
17, 1967. His application was rejected pursuant to the company policy
of hiring only females for the job of cabin attendant. Subsequently,
Diaz filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission2
 (EEOC) alleging that the airline's refusal to hire him for the
attendant's position was discriminatory under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.8
 The Commission's investigation determined that
there was reasonable cause to believe that Pan Am's hiring policy was
unlawfully discriminatory and in violation the Act.4 Diaz thereafter
commenced an individual and class action in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida under Section 706(e) 5 of
the Act seeking an injunction and damages. The district court denied
the requested relief and HELD: Pan Am did not violate the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 by utilizing a female-only hiring policy for the position of
cabin attendant.
In rejecting the plaintiff's allegations charging unlawful discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex, the court held that such discrimination was
permissible as a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) under
Section 703 (e) of the Act which provides:
Mt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to hire and employ employees, ... on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational
1
 Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970),
appeal docketed, No. 30098 (5th Cir., May 25, 1970).
2
 The EEOC is empowered under Title VII to investigate charges of unlawful
discrimination and to "endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(a) (1964).
3
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964). The basic anti-discrimination purposes of Title
VII are found in § 703(a) which provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—(1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin; (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment oppor-
tunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)
(1964).
4
 Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 2.
5
 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-5(e) (1964).
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qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise. . . .8
Central to the holding in the Diaz decision was the court's deter-
mination that the BFOQ exemption created by section 703 (e) could
be based upon job qualifications which demanded the ability to perform
non-mechanical tasks. The court accepted Pan Am's contention that
the position of flight attendant required the performance of special non-
mechanical functions such as "providing reassurance to anxious pas-
sengers, giving courteous personalized service, and, in general, making
flights as pleasurable as possible within the limitations imposed by air-
craft operations."' The court rejected the plaintiff's position that qualifi-
cation for the job of cabin attendant shoUld be based solely upon one's
ability to perform mechanical functions "such as the storage of coats
and the preparation and service of meals and beverages."' In support
of the contention that the job of cabin attendant requires non-mechani-
cal qualifications, Pan Am introduced evidence of the history of air
transportation to correlate the vast technological changes in air travel
with the changes in the cabin attendant's duties. Once primarily respon-
sible for physical tasks, the cabin attendant was relieved of these duties
when the sophistication of air travel as a means of transportation led
to a specialization in duties and the establishment of better ground
facilities.' This shift in functions led to reassessment of hiring practices
and, in 1959, Pan Am decided that it would subsequently hire only
females for the position. 10 This decision was based upon the airline's
study which demonstrated the superiority of women in performing the
non-mechanical administrative duties vital to the job of cabin attendant.
In accepting Pan Am's evidence of non-mechanical qualifications
as a basis for granting a BFOQ, the decision in Diaz is contrary to a
ruling of the EEOC on the same question which specifically excludes
the position of cabin attendant from possible inclusion within the BFOQ
exception." The Commission ruled that the job of cabin attendant
should be examined to determine "whether the basic duties of a flight
cabin attendant—whether he or she be called a purser, hostess, steward,
or stewardess—can be satisfactorily performed by members of both
sexes."" (Emphasis added.) Upon application of this mechanical test,
the EEOC held that since both sexes could perform the "basic duties"
o 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1964).
7 311 F. Supp. at 563..
8 Id.
9 Id. at 561-64.
10 Id. at 563. However, Pan Am continued to hire male cabin attendants for •cer-
tain routes until 1965. These routes were serviced by Pan Am's Latin American Division
which lagged in the introduction of jet aircraft and was slower in eliminating the per-
formance of ground duties from the job of cabin attendant. Id. at 564.
11 33 Fed. Reg. 3361 (1968).
12 Id.
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of a flight attendant, discrimination between the sexes was unlawful
and not protected by section 703 (e)."
The Diaz court, supported its rejection of the EEOC ruling and
the adoption of a non-mechanical test by reference to the legislative
history of section 703(e). The proponents of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 made it clear that Title VII was not intended to abridge "the right
which all employers would have to hire and fire on the basis of general
qualifications for the job, such as skill or intelligence."" In addition
to this basic employer right, section 703 (e) was enacted to insure
employers the right to discriminate in certain cases where sex, religion
or national origin was a valid job qualification. The following examples
were offered as permissible types of discrimination within the meaning
of section 703(e):
. . . the preference of a French restaurant for a French cook,
the preference of a professional baseball team for male players,
and the preference of a business. which seeks the patronage of
members of particular religious groups for a salesman of that
religion."
Clearly, the basic mechanical abilities necessary to prepare French
food, play baseball, or sell items to a particular religious group do not
require an individual to be of French origin, a male, or a member of
that religious affiliation. The Diaz court was therefore correct in relying
on this legislative history to support its holding that an employer may
establish qualifications based upon the ability of one sex to satisfy non-
mechanical criteria necessary for job, performance.
The court's approval of a non-mechanical standard in Diaz repre-
sents a fundamentally different approach to section 703 (e). While prior
decisions do not explicitly reject the use of a non-mechanical qualifica-
tions as criteria of a BFOQ, they do reflect a certain distrust of such an
approach. In Cheatwood v. South Central Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co.," the plaintiff's application for the position of commercial repre-
18 Id. The only indication of EEOC approval of non-mechanical qualifications is
found in an opinion of the General Counsel which stated:
It is the opinion of the Commission that Congress did not intend to disturb
reasonable employer policies designed for the health and protection of minors,
both male and female. Therefore, a newspaper publisher may refuse to employ
female minors as newspaper carriers in situations where there is reasonable basis
to believe that such female minors would be exposed to physical or moral
hazards to which male minors would not similarly be exposed.
401 FEP 3019.
14 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964) (Interpretative Memorandum submitted by Senators
Clark and Case).
15 Id. For a more complete discussion of the legislative history of Title VII, see
Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 431 (1966); Miller,
Sex Discrimination and Title VII of The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51 Minn. L. Rev.
877 (1967); Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination In American Law III: Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 Hastings L. 5. 305 (1968).
to 303 F. Supp. 754 (M.D. AIa. 1969).
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sentative, which required rural canvassing and the occasional lifting of
heavy weights, had been rejected according to the company policy of
hiring only men for that job. The employer claimed that discrimination
for this job was permissible under section 703 (e) since the work de-
manded physical capabilities not possessed by the average woman."
In addition, the employer contended that the work might place women
in danger of harrassment by subjecting them to the environs of bars
and pool halls when making collections. The court, in rejecting the em-
ployer's primary arguments of physical inability, noted that the second-
ary contentions based on potential non-physical dangers were merely
"makeweights" without foundation in the evidence. 18 It was held that
the employer had failed to prove that all or nearly all women would be
unable to cope with these intangible difficultiesP Thus, the rejection of
the defendant's arguments based upon non-mechanical job criteria is
not a wholesale condemnation of such criteria, but rather represents a
finding that non-mechanical abilities were not functionally related to
the work of a commercial representative in this case.
A similar conclusion was reached in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co., 2° where a female plaintiff's application for the
position of switchman was rejected pursuant to the company's policy
of male-only hiring for that position. The defendant employer claimed
that this discrimination was within the .BFOQ exception, contending
that women were incapable of performing the physical tasks required,'
and that the work was improper for women because it demanded late
hour call-outs." The court found no basis for the argument of physical
incapacity and rejected the assertion of impropriety as a product of
"romantic paternalism" not functionally related to sex. 23 The Weeks
court held that the BFOQ exception was never meant to limit certain
dangerous, strenuous, boring or unromantic tasks to men in perpetua-
tion of a discriminatory standard of employment. 24 The court thus re-
jected the employer's contention that a BFOQ could be based upon
intangible sex characteristics in this case since the job in question was
basically mechanical in nature and there was no need shown for non-
mechanical aptitudes.
However, unlike the employers in Cheatwood and Weeks, Pan Am
established a functional relationship between job performance and non-
mechanical sex-related qualifications. As well as utilizing its own study
of employee performance to prove this relationship, Pan Am also intro-
duced a passenger preference survey substantiating its own findings.
17 Id. at 757-58.
18 Id. at 758.
19 Id.
20 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969).
21 Id. at 234. The job of switchman required the maintenance, repair and testing
of various equipment.
22 Id. at 236.
23 Id.
24 Id.
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The results of the survey indicated that the majority of the airline's
passengers prefer to be served by female flight attendants." In addi-
tion Pan Am introduced psychiatric evidence which indicated that the
prefernce for female cabin attendants was caused by characteristics
inherent in members of the female sex which produced a uniquely
feminine response to the difficulties encountered by passengers while
in flight and a corresponding passenger acceptance of feminine assis-
tance. The court found, on the basis of all the evidence offered, that
Pan Am had established the fact that its passengers "overwhelmingly
prefer to be served by female stewardesses.726
 This preference was re-
garded as significant by the court in reaching its decision that sex was
a BFOQ for the position of cabin attendant.
However, the EEOC has rejected the use of evidence of customer
preference as a basis for the application of section 703 (e)." The Com-
mission's position has been supported by arguments denouncing the
potential prejudicial effects of such evidence." Furthermore, reliance
on customer preference criteria for application of section 703 (e) has
been criticized as being contrary to the purpose of an anti-discrimina-
tion statute such as Title VII." However, critics of the use of customer
preference have overlooked the value of such evidence in determining
qualifications for a job that requires customer contact in its perform-
ance. In work involving personal contact, a primary, if not the primary,
duty is to please customers. Therefore, of necessity, qualifications for
the position must be at least partially defined in terms of customer
preference. Furthermore, the legislative history of section 703 (e) sup-
ports the limited use of customer preference as a basis for granting a
BFOQ exception. As an example of the application of the BFOQ, it
was noted that it would be permissible for the owner of an Italian
restaurant to advertise for an Italian cook since "he would hardly be
doing his business justice by advertising for a Turk to cook spaghetti.""
25 311 F. Supp. at 564-66. The survey indicated that 79% of the passengers sur-
veyed preferred female cabin attendants, while 18% had no preference and 3% preferred
males. These overall figures represented a preference of 85% of the male passengers
surveyed for female cabin attendants while 69% of the women passengers preferred
female cabin attendants.
20 311 F. Supp. at 565.
27 The EEOC specifically rejected reliance upon customer preference in the follow-
ing manner:
(1) the Commission will find that the following situations do not warrant the
application of the bona fide occupational qualification exception . .
(iii) the refusal to hire an individual because of the preferences of co-
workers, the employer, clients, or customers except . • .
(2) where it is necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness
e.g., an actor or actress.
29 C.F.R. 1604.1(a) (1970).
28
 See Murray and Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and
Title VII, 34 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 232, 245-46 (1965).
29
 See Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50
Iowa L. Rev. 778, 797 (1965).
BD 110 Cong. Rec. 2549 (1964) (remarks of Representative Dent).
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However, it was further noted that such discrimination would be un-
lawful if applied to the job of dishwasher since there is no reason for a
dishwasher to be of a particular national origin." This example demon-
strates that evidence of Passenger preference, when related to job per-
formance, may support an application of section 703 (e) consistent with
the purpose of the BFOQ exemption.
In addition to proof that the qualifications sought by an employer
are legitimately related to job performance, section 703 (e) also requires
that an employer demonstrate that the qualifications be so predominant
in members of one sex as to allow the exclusion of all members of the
other sex from the hiring process. In Diaz, Pan Am demonstrated that
the qualifications sought in cabin attendants were predominant in fe-
males but admitted, however, that a few members of the male sex would
qualify for that position." This admission would preclude application
of section 703 (e) under a strict reading of the requirement established
in Weeks that an employer prove that "all or substantially all" mem-
bers of the excluded sex are unqualified for the work in question."
However, the Diaz court did not limit application of the BFOQ to a
finding that "all or substantially all" males were unable to perform the
duties of a cabin attendant. Rather, the court adopted the standard of
whether "it is highly impracticable to select employees on an individualbasis
 '34
Pam Am contended that while it was theoretically possible to
select those few males who would qualify as cabin attendants, it was
not practically possible to make such a determination in the hiring
process." Since the airline conducted interviews of prospective employ-
ees on a world-wide basis, interviewing great numbers of applicants in
proportion to the positions available, Pan Am claimed that it was im-
possible to make a meaningful analysis of individual applicants during
interviews." Employment testing was not used because it was unreliable
in evaluating the non-mechanical abilities necessary for the position.
Furthermore, the airline noted that the brief training system and the
lack of supervision during actual job performance made it impractical
to rely on post-employment assessment of employees." Because of these
inherent difficulties in the hiring process, the airline contended that
"to eliminate the female sex qualification would simply eliminate the
best available tool for screening out applicants likely to be unsatisfac-
tory and thus reduce the average level of per formance."" Based upon
this evidence, the court found that it would be highly impracticable for
Pan Am to select qualified male applicants on an individual basis with-
81 Id.
32
 311 F. Supp. at 567.
83 408 F.2d at 235.
34 311 F. Supp. at 566.
35
 Id, at 567.
36 Id. at 566.
87 Id. at 566-67.
88
 Id. at 567.
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out reducing the overall level of service offered by the airline, and that
sex was, therefore, a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of Pan Am's business.""
The Diaz test of impracticability, while broader than the require-
ment of "all or substantially all" enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in
Weeks, is compatible with the basic reasoning of the Weeks decision.
The court in Diaz relied upon dicta in Weeks which stated that "[it]
may be that where an employer sustains its burden in demonstrating
that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with women on an
individualized basis, it may apply a reasonable general rule."" Al-
though the argument of impracticability was not raised by the employer
in Weeks, the court felt that no such showing could be made on the
facts of that case because there was nothing unique in the employment
system or the nature of the job to support such a finding.4i In Diaz,
however, the airline's evidence of the uniqueness of the hiring system
and of the qualifications desired in cabin attendants supported use of a
standard of impracticability in applying section 703 (e).
While impracticability in hiring may be considered in the applica-
tion of section 703 (e), the use of this standard should be recognized
as limited. An excessively liberal use of this standard may result in the
sanctioning of employer practices that are contrary to the anti-discrim-
inatory purposes of Title VII. An example of such a result is the hold-
ing of the district court in Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co." In Bowe,
the plaintiffs charged their employer with discrimination in violation
of Title VII by maintaining a seniority system which was composed of
separate eligibility sections for men and women. The employer claimed
that such discrimination was lawful as a BFOQ because the job assign-
ment system in effect at the plant required the maintenance of sex-
based discrimination. The court accepted this contention and found
that the "highly refined, bizarre, and extraordinarily complex" system
supported the application of section 703 (e)." However, in Bowe, the
complexity of the system itself was the result of stereotyped weight
restrictions utilized by the employer." Certain jobs were limited to men
because males were generally considered to be stronger and therefore
better qualified. The court upheld these restrictions on the ground that
"[g] enerally recognized physical capabilities and physical limitations
of the sexes may be made the basis for occupational qualifications in
generic terms. 7"
89 Id, at 568.
40 408 F.2d at 235 n.5.
41 Id.
42 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
4a Id. at 356-57.
44 It is questionable whether the court properly considered the matter of measuring
individual ability. Rather, the court held that since the jobs required lifting heavy
weights, it was not practical to operate without the weight restriction. See Note, Civil
Rights: Judicial Interpretation of Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Exception of
1964 Civil Rights Act, 52 Minn. L. Rev. 1091 (1968).
40 272 F. Supp. at 365. The court in Weeks, while approving the result reached in
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The. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the finding
of the district court in Bowe" and held that, for a weight-lifting restric-
tion to be valid under Title VII, individual employees must be afforded
the opportunity to prove their ability to perform more strenuous tasks. 47
The generalized weight restriction as used to assign jobs by the em-
ployer in Bowe was held invalid since it was based upon broad sex
stereotypes without considering individual abilities." Thus, while the
district court was correct in its finding that it would be impracticable
for the employer to discontinue his complex seniority system, the court
erred in using impracticability as a ground for applying section 703 (e)
since the seniority system itself reflected discriminatory job assign-
ments. However, unlike the seniority syStem in Bowe, the complexity
of Pan Am's hiring system in Diaz was not based upon underlying dis-
criminatory job classifications, but resulted from the practical difficul-
ties of selecting qualified cabin attendants from a vast number of
applicants. Therefore, the use of impracticability in Diaz is not an
improper application of that standard as exemplified by the lower
court's opinion in Bowe.
The Diaz court, by extending the application of section 703 (e) to
the position of airline cabin attendant, has interpreted this section be-
yond the limits established by the EEOC." It is clear that the court
was free to contradict this ruling since the Commission's opinions,
while entitled to deference," are not binding upon the courts.5' More-
over, the liberalized application of the BFOQ exception offered in Diaz
is a needed alternative to the unworkable, overly narrow interpretation
of the EEOC. It has been demonstrated that such a narrow limitation
of the scope of section 703 (e) may lead to results which frustrate the
goals of equal opportunity employment expressed in Title VII. In Phil-
lips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,' the plaintiff, a woman with pre-school-
age children, had been denied employment by the defendant employer
pursuant to a company policy which denied women the opportunity to
work without applying a like standard to men with pre-school-age chil-
dren. The court found that this practice was "arguably an apparent
discrimination founded upon sex!'" However, the EEOC position, as
expressed in its amicus brief, indicated that this discriminatory policy
Bowe, rejected the broad rationale of the decision to the extent that it would permit
application of 703(e) upon a finding of any rational employment objective. The court
stated that such an interpretation would permit the exception to "swallow the rule."
408 F.2d at 234.
46 416 F.2d 711, 715 (7th Cir. 1969).
47 Id. at 718.
48 Id. at 717.
'19 See note 11 supra.
50 See 408 F.2d at 235, citing Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965).
51 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1234 (4th Cir. 1970); American
Newspaper Publishers Ass'n. v. Alexander, 294 F. Supp. 1100 (D.D.C. 1968).
52
 411 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969), petition for rehearing denied, 416 F.2d 1257 (1969),
vacated and remanded, 91 S. Ct. 496 (1971).
53 411 F.2d at 4.
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could not qualify for a BFOQ exemption." The Phillips court therefore
reasoned that since the Commission had so narrowed the scope of ap-
plication of the section 703 (e) exception, the only other alternative
allowing a finding of unlawful discrimination would be to construe
Title VII so as "to exclude absolutely any consideration of the differ-
ences between the normal relationships of working fathers and working
mothers to their pre-school age children."" Rather than adopt this ex-
treme interpretation, the court held that the exclusion of women from
the hiring process was not a violation of Title VII.and refused relief to
the plaintiff." Thus, the EEOC's extremely limited construction of the
BFOQ exception led the court in Phillips to reach a result that is
"palpably wrong"' in terms of the objectives of Title VII.
The Diaz court, in refusing to follow the overly narrow reading of
section 703(e) advocated by the EEOC, has adopted a more reasonable
approach that will better accomplish the basic objectives expressed in
Title VII. The exception created in section 703 (e) should not be limited
to the obvious cases where sex is vital to job qualification, such as actors,
models, washroom attendants, or fitters in girdle and brassiere estab-
lishments." By accepting the validity of non-mechanical job qualifica-
tions and a limited test of impracticability in hiring, the Diaz holding
allows application of the BFOQ exception in the less obvious cases
where members of each sex may possess the basic mechanical qualifica-
tions necessary to job performance, but one sex must be excluded from
consideration for valid reasons other than purely mechanical ability.*
JOSEPH M. PIEPtIL
64 Id.
56
 Id.
ao Id.
57
 416 F.2d 1257, 1259 (dissenting opinion). For further discussion and criticism of
the majority decision in Phillips see Note, The Mandate of Title Vii of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: To Treat Women As Individuals, 59 Geo. L.J. 221, 232-39 (1970).
BS These occupations are recognized as obvious examples of lawful sex discrimi-
nation under New York State anti-discrimination provisions that are similar to $1 703(e).
See 451 FEP 906.
* Subsequent to the completion of this article for publication, Dias was reversed
by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (April 6, 1971 No. 30098). The court
held that "discrimination based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business
operation would be undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively." The
court found that the essence of the airline's function was to supply safe transportation
and held that the non-mechanical duties of a flight attendant were merely tangential
to the airline's operation. Therefore, the court held that neither customer preference
nor the actualities of the hiring process could justify sex discrimination in this case.
It is submitted that the court's interpretation of section 703(e) is unduly narrow and,
if adopted, would render section 703 (e) virtually ineffective.
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